Timothy Frazier
NE 50/Germantown Building
U.S. DOE, 1000 Independence Ave.
Washington, DC 20585-1290
email-- ConsolidationEIS@nuclear.energy.gov

David B. McCoy's Comments on U. S. Department of Energy Consolidation of Nuclear Operations Related to Production of Radioisotope Power Systems

Scoping for Consolidation Environmental Impact Statement

Should Idahoans Trust the Department of Energy to Process Plutonium-238

in Our Neighborhood?

The DOE comes to Idaho stating that Idahoans should TRUST the DOE. ⁽¹⁾ However, in its scoping process document, Consolidation EIS Overview, offered to the public, DOE did not mention the fact that it plans to spend undisclosed hundreds of millions in upgrades to prepare or build new facilities to process Plutonium-238 which is 280 times more toxic than bomb grade Plutonium 239. This failure to communicate the plan for, and nature of, the new facility is a huge fraud on the public TRUST at the very outset of the EIS process. Is this the spirit of the new Bush Administration-- bringing a Faith-based nuclear project to Idaho?

Well, pardon some of us who may be disbelievers in DOE competence. After 50 years of DOE's dumping radioactive waste into the soil, air and water of Idaho, testing nuclear engines that released millions of curies into the environment and operating hazardous and radioactive waste processing facilities without required federal hazardous waste permits, ⁽²⁾ why should anyone TRUST the DOE? DOE is part of the U.S. nuclear mafia. ⁽³⁾

The DOE hid the ball even before the start of the scoping process. DOE failed to post the NI-PEIS on any public website so that the public could review its contents and compare it with the Consolidation EIS. DOE failed to mention or discuss the commitment of funding for a new planned facility for production and processing of Pu-238 in its scoping document handouts. This denied or limited the public opportunity at the outset of the scoping process to consider the need for the proposal, the alternatives, the environmental impacts and the significant direct, indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed action.

The purpose of the now withdrawn and unavailable NI-PEIS was to examine alternatives for production of Pu-238 for civilian nuclear development such as medical isotopes and space missions. Now, the DOE is attempting to piggyback military, i.e., "national security" needs onto the back of the NI-PEIS. This is an improper use of the NI-PEIS by the Consolidation EIS to bootstrap in new facilities to be used for military purposes while not posing or addressing the issues of nuclear weapons proliferation or militarization (weaponization) of space, and the environmental consequences of processes involved in weapons production.

Making a segmented decision and foisting it on the public without a good faith scoping procedure is a patently illegal approach under the National Environmental Policy Act. DOE makes the conclusive statement in its Overview alternative statement that it "considered whether consolidation at another site is reasonable, and determined that there is not another site that would be suitable" other than INEEL. The scoping process would thus seem to be merely a public show which is all form and no substance. Idaho is being told that no other option exists than to consolidate all production and assembly of Pu-238 in Idaho. The opinions of Idahoans are thereby condemned to irrelevance and the DOE seeks a fait accompli.

A PROGRAMMATIC EIS IS REQUIRED

Broadly, DOE must conduct environmental studies in a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to analyze the types of nuclear development contemplated for the INEEL, including, but not limited to: (1) the types and numbers of facilities, (2) where the facilities will be placed, (3) the use of the facilities, (4) the environmental impacts of each of the facilities, (5) possible alternative locations instead of at INEEL for the facilities, (6) the alternative non-nuclear facilities and (7) the advanced fuels under consideration including non-nuclear alternatives ; (8) ) the storage of nuclear wastes; (9) the disposal of nuclear wastes (10) the transport of the nuclear wastes to a repository; (11) processing the nuclear wastes; (12) security issues; (13) militarization of space; (14) accidents.

DOE has several proposed actions pending at the same time and those actions will have cumulative or synergistic environmental effects. (See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 41 (1976); 40 C.F.R.1508.25 (1989) ).

DOE must consider the cumulative and possible synergistic environmental effects of numerous projects, new facilities and the handling of associated wastes planned for Idaho including: Mission Change commercial nuclear reactors, a new research reactor, Pu-238 production, expanded Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) use, hydrogen co-generation from nuclear power, nuclear rocket engine program associated with project Prometheus, a planned Space Port, launch of space vehicles, military spy satellite, and other in relation to the environmental effects of new facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes.

Mission Change. DOE's publicly announced on July 15, 2002, that the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) would change its mission from environmental cleanup to "become the country's flagship lab for the development of nuclear energy." DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham has committed $5 million toward the goal of INEEL leading the way to the development of nuclear energy. INEEL is planning the siting and construction of Generation IV nuclear power reactors for commercial energy production. DOE's announced mission change for the Mission Change to development of nuclear power rather than environmental cleanup was accomplished without preparing an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement.

DOE must discuss the inappropriate shift in Environmental Management cleanup funds to R & D activities for the numerous projects slated for INEEL. DOE allowed money for environmental cleanup to be robbed for nuclear development. For example, "INEEL paid $755,000 for "roadmapping" of a Nuclear Energy project from the Strategic Initiative Fund in FYs 2001 and 2002." ⁽⁴⁾ In 2003, The DOE Inspector General announced an audit would be performed to determine whether "Environmental Management (EM) is funding research and development activities at the INEEL that do not contribute to EM's mission of reducing risk and accelerating cleanup (A031D030 FUNDING FOR MISSION DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AT INEEL)." ⁽⁵⁾

DOE must discuss further delays in dealing with radioactive waste removal that will be experienced by introduction of further wastes at INL by planned projects such as the Pu-238 production facilities. DOE must discuss the fact that its plans, scheduling and costs for removal of radioactive wastes from Idaho has slipped considerably. "Because of the overruns, the Department has had to cancel, defer, or reduce the scope of other mission-critical work at INEEL." The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, the Dry Storage Project for Spent Nuclear Fuel and the Three Mile Island Project are three major cleanup activities at INEEL that "have not completed the initially prescribed scope of work in accordance with their anticipated schedule." As a result the DOE will be faced with "additional costs, and will experience long-term operational impacts to other environmental management projects." A prior Audit Report (DOE/IG-0571, October 2002), "concluded that the transfer of Three Mile Island spent nuclear fuel to dry storage exceeded cost expectations by as much as $18 million and that the shipment of 3,100 cubic meters of transuranic waste out of Idaho potentially could exceed cost expectations by as much as $150 million." ⁽⁶⁾

The INEEL Mission Change does not qualify for an exemption from an EIS because it does not comply with requirements for the general or specific class of actions described in appendix A or B to Subpart B to Part 1021. Exemption from NEPA cannot be given because the mission change would directly threaten wetlands and flood plains at INEEL, Federal and state designated wilderness areas, national parks such as Yellowstone, Grand Teton, the Jim Bridger Wilderness Area and special sources of water such as the sole-source aquifer of the Snake River Plain located directly under INEEL which has been highly contaminated by the DOE operations at INEEL.

DOE must explain why it should place facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes at INL, in an area that is in direct proximity to wetlands and flood plains at INL, surrounding federal and state designated wilderness areas, national parks such as Yellowstone, Grand Teton, the Jim Bridger Wilderness Area and special sources of water such as the sole-source aquifer of the Snake River Plain located directly under INEEL, and why such placement would be less environmentally harmful than other alternative locations.

The mission change also would require siting and construction or major expansion of waste storage, disposal, recovery, or treatment facilities associated with nuclear reactor spent fuel and fuel cycle activities. 10 C.F.R. § 1021 Appendix A and B.

Nuclear power plants are controversial. No nuclear power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978 because of concerns about waste storage, availability of repository space, radiation of workers and communities, transportation, accidents, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, construction delays, regulatory compliance problems and huge cost overruns.

Nuclear reactors can have potentially devastating accidents, such as occurred at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Idaho received and is still trying to manage the nuclear waste received from the Three Mile Island accident. INEEL has no full Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") permits for the Process Waste Equipment Evaporator ("PEW"), the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator ("HLLWE"), the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal facility ("LET&D") and other facilities which are used to process nuclear wastes at INEEL. The INEEL does not have a Clean Air Act Title V air permit. Workers have been killed and irradiated by INEEL reactors. Commitment of Federal resources to nuclear power projects takes funding away from alternative energy concepts which could be far more benign.

Expanded Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). DOE must discuss whether the ATR can currently comply with the requirements of RCRA and the Clean Air Act. DOE needs to perform a full Risk Assessment for all facilities, such as the ATR, which are intended for Pu-238 production, nuclear reactors, and other space and military projects. DOE must discuss the deficient safety record, accidents and the history of regulatory noncompliance, such as lack of compliance with current seismic codes, at the ATR.

DOE must discuss the fact that "Idaho has not maintained its facilities in a safe and economical manner." This includes the ATR, where, "On November 6, 1999, a leaky valve in the primary coolant system caused an unscheduled shut down of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). The ATR lost 55 hours of operation. An internal report concluded that a lack of preventive maintenance contributed to the problem. A nearly identical failure occurred in 1996." ⁽⁷⁾

DOE must discuss commitment of Federal resources and funds to a project before even the scoping for the Consolidation EIS has been completed in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act. A 11/04 newsletter of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League indicates that DOE has already committed to supplying Neptunium Oxide to INL before the Consolidation EIS process is completed. "The HB-Line Update by WSRC explained that the H-Canyon has 4600 gallons of high concentration Neptunium-237 solution and has already begun production of Neptunium Oxide (9 months ahead of schedule). SRS plans to ship 250 kg of Np Oxide to Argonne National Labs by 2006 to make plutonium-238 for NASA." ⁽⁸⁾

Hydrogen Co-generation/nuclear reactors. DOE must discuss all of its proposals for INL in a Programmatic EIS. The Department of Energy is hoping for a demonstration of commercial-scale hydrogen production. The government is considering building the necessary next-generation nuclear power plant at INEEL.

The proposal for consolidation of radioisotope power systems along with the construction of a new research reactor, Generation IV nuclear reactors for commercial nuclear power and hydrogen cogeneration, and new fuel technologies would all take place at INEEL, which is currently designated a Superfund site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA," ). There is no reason to believe that additional wastes will not result from the radioisotope power system development and other programs. INEEL has already been the subject of federal mismanagement of dangerous radioactive and hazardous wastes, including, but not limited to both accidental and intentional releases, and illegally running numerous hazardous waste processing facilities at INTEC without the permits required under the Hazardous Waste Management Act (Resources and Conservation Recovery Act "RCRA," 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.).

Additionally, given that hydrogen is the designated "propellant" in the new DOE/NASA nuclear rocket program, DOE must fully disclose the connections/uses of the hydrogen production programs.

Space Port. Additionally, Governor Dirk Kempthorne, has funded an office to promote Spaceport Idaho. ⁽⁹⁾ Idaho has proposed that the INEEL site or some site in Idaho be used as a space center for projects such as launching space rockets. Idaho officials are hoping to build a launch pad for the space plane designed to replace space shuttles. How many different projects are planned for an Idaho Space Center and how would the existence of facilities for producing and processing Pu-238 facilitate and also attract further development and the planned projects for such a space center? The Pu-238 space battery consolidation is clearly related to the planning and facilitation of additional nuclear, military and space projects for eastern Idaho.

Space Launches. In previous environmental impact statements NASA and DOE have acknowledged that a launch accident could result in massive contamination of significant land areas with nuclear materials. DOE should describe what these potential effects would be if Idaho were to become the launch site for space missions, including military space launches.

Prometheus. What is the relation of Project Prometheus and other projects to the facilities planned for producing and processing Pu-238?

Nuclear Rocket Engines. NASA's Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, OH; and Jet Propulsion Laboratories in Pasadena, CA are testing nuclear rocket prototypes along with supporting Department of Energy national laboratories. ⁽¹⁰⁾ What aspects of this program will be conducted at INL in conjunction with the production or use of space batteries or other program aspects such as ground testing for the rockets? http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/11/science/11rocket.html

Military Spy Satellites. What is the relation of the development of a military spy satellite system to the other programs at INL along with plans for facilities for producing and processing Pu-238? ⁽¹¹⁾

The Consolidation EIS should consider or acknowledge the past accidents, mishaps, and regulatory lapses which have plagued its nuclear waste program, and which leave serious doubts about the safety of the mission change and its nuclear operations.

All of the concerns cited above which exist for building new commercial nuclear reactors at the INEEL are exacerbated by the plans to build additional facilities at the site for radioisotope power systems for national security and space exploration missions. DOE must compare these concerns for alternative sites.

DOE is required to set forth the nature of all other projects that will be enabled and attracted to Idaho as a result of the Pu-238 production facilities. DOE must discuss what additional projects will be facilitated and become desirable for location in Idaho if the Pu-238 production and processing takes place.

The Consolidation EIS must consider the impact of oversight of any facilities which may be regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. While DOE facilities have operated apart from regulation by the NRC, the Consolidation EIS should consider such regulation by the NRC as the trend to NRC regulation of DOE facilities is currently operative. As certain facilities at INL would be operated for commercial purposes they should fall under commercial regulation. If DOE has already made the determination that such oversight has been ruled out then the Consolidation EIS should clearly state this fact and if the proposed reactor could not meet the rigors of NRC regulation.

DOE must review and discuss reopening the "Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition, Final EIS, Sept. 2002, DOE/EIS-0287" to deal with the issues and alternatives surrounding the treatment and management of existing and additional radioactive and hazardous wastes. The DOE is now proposing an additional facility operation and construction which will involve the production and processing of additional highly toxic radioactive materials. DOE must include its plans for facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes in the Final High Level Waste Environmental Impact Statement and that document should be revised to account for the planned use of the INL for Pu-238 facilities and associated wastes and their removal

DOE must discuss the extent of and cumulative environmental impacts associated with the civilian and military nuclear projects planned in conjunction with the Pu-238 production plans for Idaho National Laboratory ("INL"). Clearly, there are several actions planned for INL which are connected, cumulative and similar, and are required to be examined in a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.

DOE is required to set forth and examine the potential environmental effects from the connected actions of commercial nuclear development, national security plans, space initiatives and space weapons systems.

The cumulative and synergistic impacts of building new commercial nuclear reactors along with an expanded space exploration and military/national security mission is required to be set forth by a comprehensive (programmatic) EIS. If the DOE decides not to prepare a Programmatic EIS for these broad programs, it should specify and explain the reasons for its decision not to do so. 756 F.2d143,160 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A site-specific EIS for individual actions that are part of a broad program or policy may not substitute for a comprehensive EIS where one is required. Natural Resource Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 992(D.D.C. 1978).

The INEEL mission change decision is connected to this proposed action for radioisotope power systems and other proposed actions with potentially significant impacts as well as synergistic and cumulative impacts. 10 C.F.R. §§1021.400 and 1021.410.

DOE is required to examine the cumulative significant effects which will result when the Pu-238 program is coupled with other proposed actions.

DOE is required to examine the similarity in these foreseeable agency actions which have common features with respect to timing, geography, and resources.

Cost and non-proliferation issues should be made part of the Consolidation EIS record.

The Consolidation EIS is not addressing the issues of nuclear nonproliferation which were set forth in the NI-PEIS in a limited fashion owing to the fact that military missions were not part of the proposal for expanded civilian nuclear research. Nonproliferation issues including issues regarding importation of German SNR-300 fuel played a part in the selection of Alternative 2, Option 7. However, the nonproliferation issue was sufficiently important that a NI-Nonproliferation Impact Assessment report was produced.

The continued production of fresh and recycled neptunium in the Russian nuclear program raised a significant nonproliferation concern. "Neptunium is classified as an alternate nuclear material (ANM). The utility of ANM in nuclear weapons is recognized by the U.S. Government and the international community." ⁽¹²⁾ Pu-238 is special nuclear material (SNM). However, isotopically concentrated Pu-238 (above 80%) is generally not recognized to present a nuclear proliferation threat" ... "DOE assigns this material to the lowest safeguards grade." ⁽¹³⁾ (Emphasis supplied).

The production of plutonium-238 is not consistent with United States and international policy concerning nonproliferation. The Consolidation EIS should consider nonproliferation aspects for each alternative because military plans are now obviously part of the planning for Pu-238 production. See, http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-IMPACT/2001/January/Day-26/i2271.htm

DOE must discuss the fact that "ATR is currently hosting civil radioisotope production programs" and that "when comparable alternatives exist that allow civil programs to be hosted in facilities that are eligible for international monitoring, it is preferable to maintain a separation between defense and civil programs." ⁽¹⁴⁾

The DOE must discuss continued Russian Pu-238 purchase option and the lack of any Russian moratorium on spent fuel processing and the increase of separated weapons usable neptunium which could lead to less assurance of Russian domestic safeguards for ANM and thus increasing nonproliferation uncertainties.

DOE should discuss whether the U.S. intends to reverse the moratorium on the U.S. processing of spent nuclear fuel which would thereby increase the dwindling stocks of separated neptunium available for Pu-238. If this course is to be taken, then the DOE additionally needs to discuss the nonproliferation concerns as well as the additional environmental concerns from the resumption of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. DOE must discuss all facilities which it intends to use at INL if reprocessing of spent fuel is intended.

DOE must discuss the legal, environmental and proliferation issues surrounding the resumption of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

DOE needs to discuss the alternatives fuels to Pu-238 if the decision to not resume reprocessing is not an option. DOE has failed to make any case for why space batteries should not be made of solar cells or long lived fuel cells. The stars and the planets are not going to suddenly disappear.

Also, DOE must discuss the benefit that additional solar and fuel cell research may offer to reduce environmental damage, radioactive and hazardous waste generation and the benefit of identifying new means for energy production in light of diminishing and finite petroleum resources.

The Consolidation EIS must discuss production of plutonium-238 and space missions enabling the proliferation of other space based nuclear weapons of mass destruction for military uses. The NI-EIS did not present any analysis of the RPS program to the extent which may encompass far reaching military applications

The NI-PEIS and the Consolidation EIS avoid, but DOE must now provide, discussion of the use of plutonium-238 by defense and intelligence agencies. As plutonium-238 is apparently used in communication and detection devices used by the U.S. Navy, any possible production in ATR and the other reactors for defense use must be discussed in the Consolidation EIS. As no such discussion has taken place in the NI-PEIS one must assume that DOE has failed to yet consider the environmental and nonproliferation consequences of further Pu-238 production for defense purposes. There is the potential for the use of Pu-238 in laser weapons, military surveillance satellites and other military applications.

It is believed that plutonium-238 is used in the Navy's Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), which consists of hundreds of sea bed monitors It is also known that the Navy has placed terrestrial devices containing Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs), which contain plutonium-238, at remote locations for powering instrumentation

It would be an inappropriately narrow interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act for the Consolidation EIS to avoid the issue of costs and nonproliferation since the Pu-238 production mission is to now clearly be used for military/national security. Previous DOE EISs, such as DOE's foreign spent fuel take-back EIS, have included detailed non-proliferation analyses. Cost analyses have also been included in some EISs as well and should be included in the Consolidation EIS.

DOE must discuss the role of the US as leading the world into an era of the militarization of space with weapons of mass destruction orbiting the earth, aimed at the earth from those orbits or perhaps from military bases on the moon. Militarization of space represents an entirely new magnitude of threat to the entire planet as other nations will add their weapons and satellites to the skies above us. Should humans not be able to look at the heavens without the fear of death raining down upon them?

DOE should discuss whether it intends to use the RTG units in production of atomic bombs or for replacement of existing power sources of nuclear warheads. The use of Pu-238 as RTG power source in nuclear warheads has been documented. ⁽¹⁵⁾

"Over sixty nuclear-powered spacecraft have been launched by the United States and the former Soviet Union. About 15% of these have experienced failures of some kind. Some of the failures resulted in radioactive contamination on earth. Yet currently there are no international guidelines or regulations addressing the deployment and operation of nuclear reactors placed into earth orbit ... There are many arms control benefits in banning nuclear reactors from earth orbit. For example, no new Russian radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs) would be launched and the United States would have no need to continue developing its anti-satellite weapon systems (ASAT) weapons program. Most importantly, a ban would contribute to preventing the deployment of weapons in space. The precedent of deploying space-based weapon systems would have serious implications for the future national security of the United States as additional nations achieve the capability of launching earth satellite systems. This first step in the weaponization of space is a serious decision worthy of debate by all nations." ⁽¹⁶⁾

DOE must discuss the environmental effects of the destruction of orbiting military vehicles containing radioactive substances or onboard nuclear reactors which will break up either by degradation or be destroyed by attacking enemy weapons and then reenter the earth's atmosphere causing exposure of the planet's people to radiation.

Prevention of a space weapons race. The frightening specter of the US leading the way to international growth and proliferation in the construction and use of military nuclear reactors and spy satellite systems or other weapons containing radiation demands first that the US government not create these systems and enter treaties to ban these weapons. It also demands that DOE consider methods to prevent re-entry and burn-up of these generators and reactors orbiting the earth today, rather than leave the problem to our descendants. Alternatives to nuclear powered space missions should be found. As the skies above us grow more contaminated with radiation orbiting the earth, the environment and human health of peoples of all nations are threatened.

The DOE must discuss whether INL is to be involved with plans to further development of the SP-100 reactors through the national military/national security or space mission. "The United States has been involved with developing the SP-100 reactor to develop 100 kW (electric) space reactors which would be fueled with highly enriched (bomb grade) uranium 235. "These reactors are intended for military applications such as powering orbiting battle stations for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Initially, these reactors would provide electrical power for maintenance and operation of satellite battle stations (e.g., targeting, tracking, and orbital maneuvering). The American Physical Society has estimated that the SDI program would require about 100 of these reactors in earth orbit. Each SP-100 reactor would contain several hundred times the radioactivity of a single Russian RORSAT. That is, at the conclusion of its seven year design lifetime, the total quantity of radioactive fission products onboard each SP-100 reactor would be equivalent to the radioactivity from 30 detonated nuclear weapons of the size that destroyed Hiroshima in World War II. By comparison, the failed Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite generated only about 1% of the radioactivity of a single Hiroshima weapon. It is therefore evident that the deployment of SP-100 nuclear reactors in earth orbit represents a dramatic increase in the potential for radioactive contamination of the earth's environment. It is this health and safety issue that must be addressed on an international level because all nations may be affected by any nuclear reactor failure which occurs in near earth orbit." ⁽¹⁷⁾

DOE must fully discuss Alternative Locations for the Pu-238 production. Given the public opposition at Hanford ⁽¹⁸⁾, Savannah River Site (SRS) ^{(19) (20)}and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to Pu-238 processing, one questions whether Idaho is now the prime location because DOE has fouled operations at LANL, SRS and Hanford and angered the local populations. "SRS tank farms store approximately 35 million gallons of liquid waste, constituting over one half (533 million curies) of DOE's high level radioactivity. These wastes present large radiological, environmental, fire, and other hazards." ⁽²¹⁾ The history of Pu-238 processing at SRS is not a pretty one. ⁽²²⁾ As recently as January 2004, the SRS HB line had a pyrophoric reaction that was observed by operators on the HB-Line while preparing plutonium scrap material to be charged in the Phase I dissolver. ⁽²³⁾

DOE must discuss the alternative of continuing the use of SRS facilities for Pu-238 production because ..."HB Line facilities will remain operational through FY 2010" according to PREDECISIONAL DRAFT SRS Environmental Management Program Performance Management Plan 2004 PMP 4-22-04 8.11B. ⁽²⁴⁾

DOE must consider and discuss whether the decision to place the project at INL, Idaho, is driven more by considerations of political expediency ⁽²⁵⁾ rather than careful analysis of the various environmental and human health concerns. INL, near Idaho Falls, is more of a "company town" setting for the DOE that is highly dependent on DOE dollars within a small populated community where voices of opposition to DOE plans are not often raised.

Alternatives which exist at other sites for Pu-238 production must be examined. "The possibility of producing up to 5 kg per year of Pu-238 at the ATR, HFIR, and REDC is attractive because the REDC has clean, empty cells in a modern, operating building. DOE has developed a safe-storage program for DOE's U-233 in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's recommendation97-1." ⁽²⁶⁾ DOE must disclose the environmental, emissions and waste issues at these other locations for comparison with the INL site for Pu-238 production.

Why is DOE now planning the additional pork barrel spending of $230 million or more for facility upgrades in Idaho, when DOE already had the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford, Washington, which was designed to produce Pu-238 and also meet needs for military isotopes? Why is DOE now closing and abandoning the FFTF at a cost of $230 million just for dismantlement after keeping the FFTF in stand-by mode for years at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars?

DOE must discuss and answer the question of whether the purported "security concerns" are not played up as a smokescreen to override a more serious failure of comparison of alternative locations, facilities, fuels and environmental consequences that should, but are not being considered ⁽²⁷⁾ by DOE for military operations hiding in the public relations disguise of a space suit. DOE must discuss the fact that security concerns are problematic throughout the DOE complexes. (Also, see below at pp. 20 and 25).

Alternatives to Pu-238

DOE must discuss the existence and availability of alternative fuels for space travel and the elimination of environmental hazards and reduction of nuclear waste. New solar cells with record efficiency have been reported in Europe. Under contract with ESA, European industry has recently developed high efficiency solar cells for use in future demanding deep-space missions such as the recently approved ROSETTA mission, launched March 2, 2004 that will fly to a comet near Jupiter. The new solar cells reach a 25% efficiency under deep space conditions. ⁽²⁸⁾

The DOE must reexamine its statement in the 1995 Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) that "The RTGs are the only power systems that can meet the needs of deep space planetary missions. These missions are too far from the Sun for solar panels to be effective, and the missions take too long to use batteries." ⁽²⁹⁾

Until now, deep space probes had to use thermonuclear power generators, like the so called RTGs (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators). As RTG's technology is not available in Europe, ESA therefore attempted to develop a power source based on very high-efficiency solar cells. ESA expects that the new high performance Silicon solar cells could profitably be used in deep space missions for Europe and that this technology could also be of interest for near-Earth orbit space applications as well as for Earth based ones." "

DOE must discuss the amounts of Pu-238 that are needed for space missions on an annual basis, also in light of alternative power sources.

DOE must discuss the amounts of Pu-238 that are needed for military/national security on an annual basis.

DOE must discuss whether adoption newer technology has or can reduce or eliminate the need for Pu-238 applications for space and military needs. DOE must perform an analysis considering the environment and cost/benefits of adopting and developing alternative power technologies.

DOE must discuss the alternative potential sources which are currently available for meeting Pu-238 needs in terms of existing US reactors and worldwide sources. It may be that building a new reactor is not necessary.

DOE must discuss the manner in which Neptunium 237 stock is obtained, the total stocks available for domestic and foreign sources and the limits to existing supplies of neptunium in the absence of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.

DOE should discuss the ethics of using technology to produce weapons of mass destruction or the ethics of building, threatening to use, and actually using such weapons from land bases or from space. DOE may be planning to build military bases on the moon and use nuclear fueled rockets to do so. ⁽³⁰⁾

As part of a risk/benefit analysis of plans for space based missile defense National Missile Defense system, DOE must consider whether the premise and technology envisioned and its enormous costs would even be effective against existing threats. "The Bush administration's dream of a viable NMD has been rendered fantasy by the Russian test of the SS-27 Topol-M. According to the Russians, the Topol-M has high-speed solid-fuel boosters that rapidly lift the missile into the atmosphere, making boost-phase interception impossible unless one is located practically next door to the launcher. The SS-27 has been hardened against laser weapons and has a highly maneuverable post-boost vehicle that can defeat any intercept capability as it dispenses up to three warheads and four sophisticated decoys."... "The US cannot afford to spend billions of dollars on a missile-defense system that will never achieve the level of defense envisioned. The Bush administration's embrace of technology, and rejection of diplomacy, when it comes to arms control has failed." ⁽³¹⁾

DOE community effects

Conflict with existing waste removal program at INL

"The INEEL has one of the largest stockpiles of transuranic (plutonium-contaminated) waste in the world. Since the 1970s, the State of Idaho has been concerned that this waste could eventually contaminate the Snake River Plain Aquifer." ⁽³²⁾

The economic and environmental consequences of more waste and funds expended in competition with the INL clean up mission must be examined. Currently, the DOE has not completed removal of its radioactive wastes from above and down in the aquifer, or from its eleven 300,000 gallon storage tanks, packaged them, and removed them from Idaho. Constant lawsuits are required to get DOE to live up to its commitments. DOE constantly tries to redefine terms of legal agreements, such as "low level" and "high level" waste, to avoid meeting its responsibilities. DOE plans to leave wastes in tanks in noncompliance with the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act knowing full well that such wastes cannot be effectively grouted. That plan is currently being litigated in NRDC v. DOE.

Critics such as the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) - comprising over thirty local, regional, and national organizations representing the concerns of communities living in the shadows of the US nuclear weapons complex sites - charge that investment in FFTF development would divert resources away from the major cleanup programs such as that for the old K-Basins, pools holding 2,300 tonnes of irradiated nuclear fuel. Cleanup of the K-Basins is expected to cost $1.6 billion and to be completed by 2005.

DOE must discuss whether the use of funds for Pu-238 and other programs, listed above, will increase the quantities of nuclear and hazardous waste at INL and increase the difficulties associated with waste remediation and removal at INL.

What are the air emissions and solid, and liquid wastes that will be released from the programs contemplated for INL? What we can TRUST the DOE to do is to totally contaminate a multi-million dollar buildings with radiation and release further unknown quantities of radioactive and hazardous wastes into our soil, air and water in the process and leaving us with more radioactive solid waste monoliths for our children to dispose of.

The US government has committed decades of atrocities against its own citizens under the dark secrecy of national security. There should be no blank checks issued to the DOE for military/national security weapons projects. Idaho downwinders and others have struggled to gain recognition and compensation from DOE for their exposures to radiation and ensuing cancers.

"During the 1950s and early 1960s, the era of atmospheric nuclear testing, the U.S. government was secretly informing photographic film producers of expected fallout patterns so they could protect their film supply. While warning Eastman Kodak and its ilk about tests dates and wind directions, the U.S. government did nothing to inform downwinders so they could take precautions, nor did they inform milk producers so that they could protect a vital component of the food supply.

"From the 1940s into the 1970s, more than 23,000 people were subjected to radiation experiments, many without their informed consent. They were administered by the AEC, DOE, Department of Defense, NASA and Department of Veterans Affairs for purposes including radiation weapon development and determining radiation's effects on military personnel performance in the battlefield. One experiment involved feeding oatmeal with radioactive trace elements to more than 100 boys at a Massachusett's school. Others were testicular irradiation experiments on prisoners to determine what doses induce sterility, and experiments on pregnant women. In 1993, upon learning of a particularly troubling series of experiments involving the injection of plutonium into unknowing subjects, then Secretary O'Leary remarked, "The only thing I could think of was Nazi Germany."

"In the 1950s and early 1960s, most workers at the Fernald nuclear weapons plant near Cincinnati were overexposed to uranium without their knowledge or consent. Because of the toxicity of uranium as a heavy metal, many workers probably also suffered kidney damage. Yet they were reassured that they were not being harmed.

"In other nuclear weapons plants, AEC and plant managers were aware that workers were being overexposed over prolonged periods of time, yet there was no indication they shared this information with the workers. In fact, there are documents showing that they deliberately deceived workers about the levels of radiation to which they were being exposed.". ⁽³³⁾

DOE must discuss in the Consolidation EIS and with Idahoans the fact that HEPA filters do not safely contain Pu-238 from contaminating workers or the environment.

DOE must discuss why the LANL historical plutonium emissions into the air of 3.4 Ci is about 20 times the amount of plutonium that was deposited onto the LANL site from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, based on current estimates. ⁽³⁴⁾ LANL workers were contaminated with Plutonium and spread the contamination at TA-55 where Pu-238 is produced requiring an eight month shutdown. ⁽³⁵⁾ DOE must discuss the implications of worker and community contamination and pollution from the proposed operations at INL.

During the nuclear generator production process for the NASA Cassini mission over 244 cases of worker contamination were reported at LANL in New Mexico (between 1993-1995). ⁽³⁶⁾ DOE has consistently shown its inability or unwillingness to protect worker health and safety. DOE should set forth those incidents of worker contamination for the Idaho public to know what they will be getting. DOE has demonstrated a lengthy and uniform record of safety incompetence at all sites it manages.

DOE must discuss that workers and the health of the surrounding community for INL will stand at great risk for receiving a body burden of radiation which will cumulatively add to that already received from operations over the past 50 years which have resulted in increased cancers in the region. See the CDC/NIOSH DRAFT INEEL Worker Study that found increased cancer rates. WWW.CDC.GOV/NIOSH/2001-133.HTML]

How much Pu-238 was processed at ORNL and LANL and what is the level of contamination and the waste created by those operations? What has been the success of disposing of those wastes? Did any of those wastes come to Idaho for processing? See http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/brochure/pdf/lahdra_draft_rpt.pdf

DOE should discuss the effects upon universities and other institutions of research and learning in Idaho resulting from secrecy and dependence on military contracting. DOE plans to increase takeover of the Idaho State University and University of Idaho programs in Idaho Falls. ⁽³⁷⁾ Why should University programs, which are paid for by the public, not be for alternative energy program instruction? Educational, technical, medical and legal experts are for the most part silenced by DOE consulting fees, grants and contract work. Money buys research but it induces deference to not speak out against DOE projects. DOE hearings in Idaho Falls are loaded with active and retired DOE personnel who will support almost any nuclear proposal put forward for the INL. Whistleblowers are silenced by DOE by harassment, termination or settlements binding them to silence.

DOE must inform Idahoans as to whether the wastes created from Pu-238 production are intended to remain in Idaho or be removed. DOE has asked Congress to allow it to reclassify wastes currently designated as "high-level" and hence requiring deep geologic disposal as "incidental waste" that could be disposed of in shallow burial sites. DOE must discuss that if it is actually permitted to leave vast amounts of radioactivity in place in shallow dumps, capped or grouted, the DOE would be putting some of the most precious water resources of the United States at risk, including the Snake River Plain Aquifer in Idaho, which is a sole source aquifer for much of southern Idaho, where 75 percent of the country's commercial rainbow trout are grown. ⁽³⁸⁾

DOE should inform the public and discuss how many different processes are involved for processing Pu-238 and the consequences of each process individually and in conjunction with the others.

What are the current facilities available at INL and elsewhere for Pu-238 production and processing?

What expansions in equipment and manpower are planned for existing facilities to meet Pu-238 transportation, production, waste processing and waste handling?

What additional facilities will be required? Describe the above facilities with alternatives already existing or available and compare environmental costs and impacts. Include non-nuclear alternatives.

Have the current facilities at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for processing Pu-238 become contaminated to the point where operations had to cease and radioactive wastes from the operation are planned to be sent to Nevada? ^{(39) (40)} ORNL had a Pu-238 processing fire/explosion in May 2003. ⁽⁴¹⁾ During the period 1993 to 2000 there were more than 300 safety occurrences at TA-55 including the risk of Plutonium fires where Pu-238 is processed at LANL, according to the senior occurrence investigator at LANL. ⁽⁴²⁾ Glovebox fires, which have occurred at TA-55, can breach barriers intended to prevent the spread of contamination as well as constitute an industrial safety hazard. A review of the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System also identified numerous instances of failed glovebox fire protection systems, missed glovebox fire protection system surveillances and inappropriate glovebox fire protection related activities. ⁽⁴³⁾ In one instance, a "fire was caused by enough Pu-238 to generate about 10 watts of heat, which ignited a rag weighing 113 grams and generated about 2 megajoules of heat." ⁽⁴⁴⁾

DOE should explain why the enormous cost of producing, assembling and launching highly radioactive nuclear materials into space is justified when the nation has a major fiscal crisis. Cutbacks in education, health care, environmental clean-up and other social programs will be necessary to pay for the expansion of nuclear power for space missions and military space projects. President Bush has stated, "We will submit a budget that fits the times. It will provide every tool and resource to the military, will protect the homeland and meet other priorities of the government," he explained. The President will reveal further details when he sends his 2006 budget message to the Capitol next February, although the intention has been clear since last spring. What we can anticipate is the usual slashing of domestic programs. This conservative pattern dates back to the Reagan era: spend big on the military and tax breaks for the wealthy, then cut back on school lunches, Medicaid, veterans' health care and clean water." ⁽⁴⁵⁾

DOE should explain why the environmental effects of the use of nuclear materials for space exploration would be less environmentally harmful than the development of alternative non-radioactive technologies for space exploration. For example, is there the possibility that a combined photovoltaic/thermoelectric converter system ⁽⁴⁶⁾ is several times more efficient than the existing RTG design? Could such a system or similar systems be used in combination with an RTG to reduce the need for Pu-238 production?

DOE must discuss the availability of other nuclear power sources other than Pu-238 which could be used for making Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG). ⁽⁴⁷⁾

What are the "other national security needs" that DOE says it intends to meet with Pu-238 production?

What are the environmental effects going to be for the projects envisioned for accomplishing the national security goals?

DOE must provide a scientific basis for accident and release fraction estimates, based on real, historical data as well as realistic technical analysis. What is the expected rate of accidents, based on historical data for facilities producing and processing Pu-238 that can be expected at INL? What are the levels of contamination based on the historical data at INL that will result?

1. Provide a realistic analysis of the risk, taking into account the fires that have recently occurred at INL and the fact that there is a major seismic and volcanic system within the region.

2. Provide details on any hot cell or irradiated material processing that would occur in the new facility and explicitly include a range of fission products, as they are proposed to be present in the facility, in accident and radiation dose scenarios and social and economic impacts of accidents.

3. Estimate that consequences of severe events to life and property, given that nearby areas may be converted into de facto radioactive waste sites in the event of a facility-wide spill.

4. Estimate the consequences to the present national nuclear posture in case of a severe event.

5. Estimate the consequences to the economy and society of Idaho in case of a severe event.

6. Provide a detailed case for why the new facility is needed, with and without the assumption that the new Facility might be built.

7. Provide an analysis of the consequences of similar events at a different location, where severe fires pose a smaller hazard than at INL.

8. Extend the accident analysis radius to include impacts on Wyoming and all surrounding national monuments, federal parks and state parks.

9. Perform a detailed analysis of the consequences of severe plutonium releases on the nearby Native American cultures.

10. Perform a detailed analysis of the consequences of severe plutonium releases on the Snake River, the Snake River Aquifer, on the economy and society of nearby communities, of Idaho, and of states near Idaho.

11. Provide an alternative in which no new facility is built and the present inventory of plutonium at INL could be reduced.

12. Provide an environmental justice analysis in case lands of the Native peoples have to be abandoned.

DOE would be disingenuous if it claims there will not be environmental releases and resulting contamination. As recently as April 2002, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board examining the LANL Pu-238 program found: inadequate safety controls to prevent releases, failure to identify hazards, heavy over reliance on administrative controls instead of equipment and failure to identify necessary controls. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Examples of incompletely evaluated hazards, accident scenarios, and controls included the following: Deflagration--Flammable gas generation by thermal and radiolytic decomposition; Resin Accidents; Mechanical and Chemical Hazards.

Accidents at LANL T-55 area have included glovebox accidents causing worker contamination and failure of Teflon compression fittings for valves in the glove boxes. Poor maintenance procedures were present as well: 16,500 out of 50,000 Teflon fittings were found to be loose with some of them indicating leakage of contamination. http://www.eh.doe.gov/docs/hha/hha_2000_1a.html

Seven Savannah River Site ("SRS") employees were contaminated with plutonium on their clothing and skin during an incident on 1 September 1999. Four of the seven inhaled the plutonium while involved in repackaging plutonium stored in the container when the incident occurred. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

INL currently is required to remove enormous amounts of contamination from the INL. DOE must discuss the potential that Idaho is proposed as a site to bring in an unspecified amount of additional radioactive substances which will place a further burden on public health in the event of radiological accidents.

Space accidents and risks

This commentator objects to the forced assumption of public risk that is undertaken by space missions such as Cassini which had approximately 72 pounds of plutonium on board. Out of approximately 63 nuclear powered space missions reported prior to Cassini, nine resulted in problems or accidents (approximately one in seven).

What are the potential accidents that can occur as a result of the use of the Pu-238 in space batteries?

What are the potential accidents that can occur from the use of Pu-238 in the RPSs?

The SNAP-9A Accident in 1964 released ~ 17,000 Ci when a Plutonium powered satellite fell back to earth, disintegrated and spread Pu-238 over every continent at every latitude. Approximately 2.1 pounds of Plutonium were released. Dr. John Gofman links this release to increased lung cancer. The global environment was affected by this accident which was a result of the use of Plutonium as a power source for space missions.

DOE should provide an estimate of how many space missions are planned which will entail the launch of vehicles containing Pu-238 or other nuclear materials.

DOE must discuss the number of space missions planned as a single category and then in conjunction with the military missions. DOE must discuss the increased risk to the community of these combined missions. DOE must discuss the increased risk of these missions for the state of Idaho and neighboring states in the event that Idaho is used as a launch area for these missions.

DOE should provide an estimate of the expected failure rate for space missions and the amounts of Pu-238 and other radionuclides which can be released in the event of accidents and the human health and environmental consequences for each such accident.

DOE should provide the expected failure rates for containment of RPS in space vehicles, the failure of nuclear rockets and space weapons and the human health and environmental consequences for these failures including the possibility of recovery of RPS by terrorists.

Security.

DOE may be incapable of providing adequate security for its Pu-238 production facilities. Recent problems at ORNL's Y-12 weapons plant have been noted by the media and inspector general. Though Y-12 is a weapons plant, the drill incident may have negative implications for the civilian nuclear industry. Earlier this year the trade association that represents the power reactor operators hired Wackenhut to help conduct similar "force-on-force" drills at the 63 nuclear power plant sites. DOE needs to let Idahoans know why security at INL will be any more effective than the bumbling at other DOE facilities. ⁽⁵¹⁾

DOE should discuss security mishaps which have occurred at facilities producing or handling Pu-238 and DOE's reasons for believing that INL will not present the same type of security risks. DOE should provide an analysis that considers all of the types of facilities planned for Idaho and whether INL would become a greater problem if those programs were to be carried out. DOE must discuss the enhanced attractiveness of INL for security risks as programs and manpower is added. DOE must compare costs with alternative facilities.

DOE must discuss whether it has completed necessary requirements by the DOE Inspector General to the security risks from cyber attacks on INL computer systems involving classified and nuclear weapons information and security of its networking infrastructure necessary for critical systems. ⁽⁵²⁾

DOE should describe what the potential environmental effects would be from credible attacks against facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes. Compare these risks with attacks on facilities of alternative non-nuclear power sources.

DOE should provide some description.of the additional precautions that it will take to insure against credible hostile attacks against facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes.

DOE must discuss why the credible attacks against various DOE facilities and the environmental effects of such attacks would be heightened or reduced by the use of alternative locations or by keeping operations separated under the no change alternative.

DOE must discuss the potential releases for Pu-238 which may occur as a result of credible hostile attacks on facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes.

DOE must discuss the environmental consequences from the types of attacks that might occur against nuclear facilities for Pu-238 production with the consequences of attacks against the alternative of solar or fuel cell facilities.

DOE must discuss whether many of the security challenges facing INEEL are similar or different to those faced by all DOE national laboratories.

DOE must discuss why the missing and unaccounted for 765 kilograms of plutonium at LANL -- enough to make 150 nuclear weapons- won't occur at INL. ⁽⁵³⁾ DOE must discuss why it believes such occurrences would occur again at LANL so as to render LANL unsuitable for use in the Pu-238 production.

DOE must discuss why it believes that INL would be any better a location than other alternative DOE sites as regards immunity to problems of worker theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, theft of information or nuclear materials. DOE must discuss the increased attractiveness of INL as a target for such activities as INL increases the number of facilities, projects and manpower.

DOE must discuss the missing top secret data, along with a series of worker injuries, that resulted in the temporary suspension of virtually all activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. On July 7, 2004, Los Alamo halted its work on nuclear weapons research after two data storage disks full of classified information were reported missing. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ How can DOE assure Idaho that it will not perform in its usual haphazard fashion and that security, performance and safety will be better at Idaho than at LANL, ORNL or SRS?

DOE must discuss the expected failure rate or deliberate releases which may result for Pu-238 for "national security" associated events and the human and environmental consequences of those releases.

DOE should provide data which will indicate what the potential level of new risk is that the community must expect from the facilities producing and processing Pu-238 and the associated wastes will be.

DOE must discuss any reductions in civil liberties which will result from more DOE facilities and projects in Idaho.

Waste Management

DOE operates a shell game when it comes to managing radioactive wastes. DOE plans for managing radioactive wastes shift like sand in the wind and is without any comprehensive plan. Radioactive waste cleanup is a $220 billion problem at some 114 DOE sites. "Some twenty-two tonnes of stainless steel and zirconium-clad fuel rods are also stored at SRS Because they cannot be melted, those rods will be shipped to Idaho for long-term storage, DOE says. SRS already poses a huge cleanup challenge, with tritium contamination emerging as an increasingly large problem." ⁽⁵⁵⁾ At Pantex, in Texas, as the DNFSB said in August 1999, "DOE's program plan for materials disposition is in peril regarding recycling excess pits into mixed oxide fuel, because there is no container suitable for shipping the pits [plutonium bomb triggers] from the Pantex Plant to the Savannah River Site, and no plans exist for development of such a container". Nevada has filed lawsuits to prevent Yucca Mountain from being opened.

DOE apparently is planning to export SRS waste problems to INL. Each problem DOE site (and all DOE sites are a problem) is promised that the waste will be removed to a different location. SRS is told wastes will go to INL. Idaho was told wastes would go to Hanford for pyroprocessing. Washington didn't want INL wastes and became unavailable for processing, so now Idaho is told that the wastes will go to WIPP in New Mexico or Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Pantex was told its problems would be sent problems to SRS.

The track record of federal research facilities handling Plutonium and other radioactive wastes is that these facilities have mishandled Plutonium and other radioactive substances resulting in leakage, contamination of the research sites and surrounding communities. Hanford WA, West Valley NY, Los Alamos NM, Savannah River SC, Rocky Flats CO, and INL ID have all contaminated the environment and the people in surrounding communities with radiation. The groundwater at the INL is contaminated with Pu-238 and Pu-240.

There is no assurance that waste acceptance criteria for WIPP or Yucca Mountain will be met by Idaho for wastes which it must process related to the Pu-238 program.

Until recently, Hanford was to become the hub for Pu-238 production. Amongst the possible uses promoted for the FFTF were plutonium-238 production for NASA space batteries; the accelerator transmutation of waste; isotope experimentation and tritium production (for details visit: http://www.ne.doe.gov). But the Government Accountability Project (GAP) charged that the civilian missions proposed for FFTF masked the true rationale which, according to a recently released internal memorandum, is production of "special isotopes in significant quantities for national security." DOE must address this charge.

The situation for Idaho is not much different from Hanford. Idaho is being told the Pu-238 operation will be for space batteries. In reality, the DOE simply plans to shift to Idaho a program designed primarily for military needs that DOE planned to accomplish at Hanford Washington. The DOE is attempting to again mask its military applications behind the public relations smokescreen of space exploration and the mantra of "Trust Us".

As at Hanford, DOE has not resolved the waste problems in Idaho. DOE now intends to bring Idaho the program which was rejected at Hanford even though Hanford had the FFTF which was left in stand-by mode for years at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars and will cost $230 million dollars to dismantle, the same price tag for a new facility at Idaho. DOE, in its wasteful ambitions and ill-planned programs, certainly has no sympathy for the US taxpayer.

The total quantities of waste - solid, liquid, air emissions -- that will result from the processing of the Pu-238 at INL need to be set forward. These quantities of waste need to be analyzed with the total wastes that DOE has waiting in the wings to send to Idaho from all other foreign and domestic sources along with the waste that Idaho already has. The total amount of waste from all sources needs to be analyzed against the waste acceptance criteria for wherever the Idaho wastes will purportedly be sent.

The expected release of radioactive wastes from processing the radioactive materials, based on historical data for releases, accidental and routine, needs to be set forth.

DOE must discuss how much "orphan waste" is ultimately going to remain in Idaho with no place to go except to sit over the Snake River Aquifer in a waste pond or rusting 55 gallon drums? How much orphan waste is already in Idaho with no place to go?

DOE must discuss the history of accidents at the ATR facility at INL and explain why the ATR will be any more effective in handling the Pu-238 production and wastes than alternative facilities. DOE must discuss the costs associated with training workers and the costs of the learning curve for use of ATR and any proposed new facilities compared to what those costs would be if existing facilities were to be used instead of INL.

Another 'argument' to restart FFTF at Hanford was the availability of 'cheap' Kalkar plutonium fuel. The German fast breeder reactor SNR-300 at Kalkar has never been put into operation - the site has been transformed into an adventure park - and the German government has not yet decided what to do with the radioactive core it has in store. The U.S. idea to use it at Hanford would solve many problems in Germany. DOE must discuss whether Idaho will become the solution to the German problem of waste disposal for Kalkar?

DOE should describe all offsite and onsite needs necessary to accomplishing transportation, production, processing, treatment, storage, waste removal and ultimate "disposal." The DOE plans not only to use existing sources of Pu-238 at Argonne Nation Laboratory West but to import additional sources from other locations in the United States and to purchase the materials from Russia or the former Soviet Union. What quantities would be present at INL and what are the sources of those quantities from each source? Idaho may receive potentially enormous quantities of highly radioactive materials from within the US and from abroad increasing the amount of radioactive materials to be transported, processed and treated, stored and disposed of by means that are not or may not be currently in place.

DOE must set forth the Waste Acceptance Criteria to compare with the wastes to be generated to determine if the wastes would be eligible for WIPP or Yucca Mountain. The glib DOE assumption that the wastes from the RPS operation will be sent to WIPP or Yucca Mountain is far from certain. It is not clear that Yucca Mountain will be available for receiving the wastes in light of numerous lawsuits over the site itself. DOE should provide problems and options which may be necessary if Yucca Mountain does not become available or the Waste Acceptance Criteria cannot be met.

The Consolidation EIS should address how the most vulnerable individuals - such as infants, the elderly, or the already sick - will suffer from continued exposure to radioactive and toxic wastes including those cumulative affects from prior year operations of INEEL as a generator, processor, storage and transporter of wastes with the wastes that may now be environmentally released. The alternatives should be set forth.

DOE must discuss the position of the Consolidation EIS regarding foreign supply of medical isotopes for U.S. needs. Other foreign producers of medical isotopes exist and other sources might be developed yet the Consolidation EIS and the NI-PEIS failed to review the potential of any of these sources to fill U.S. isotope demand. In order to fully address the need for DOE to guarantee that the necessary supply of isotopes is achieved will require an assessment of foreign supply as well as domestic supply. As the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee has addressed the need for "dependable" sources of isotopes, it is incumbent on DOE to assess foreign supply as foreign sources could well prove to be dependable and cheaper than U.S. sources.

What quantity of foreign isotopes currently meet U.S. demand and what the foreign supply is anticipated to be in the future? Supply of isotopes from Canada is of special note. As DOE is well aware, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an export license to Canadian entities for U.S.-supplied highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce molybdenum-99 for the U.S. market. MDS Nordion, a Canadian company, and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) received an export license on July 27, 2000, and in the NRC''s Staff Requirements Memorandum issued on that day, the NRC reflected the importance of the Canadian source of moly-99 by stating that "the Commission was sensitive to the importance of maintaining an uninterruptible supply of medical isotopes." In oral testimony before the NRC on at least two occasions in the past 2 years and in various written submissions, officials from the U.S. State Department expressed strong support for such export in order to ensure isotope production for U.S. needs. At no time in the license review process has either the NRC or the State Department questioned the reliance on a foreign source for this critical isotope supply as being contrary to U.S. policy.

DOE should discuss whether if foreign isotopes are to be supplied for medical purposes, perhaps it is not necessary to build another reactor at INL and the needs for Pu-238 production can be met by existing reactors at INL, HFIR and LANL with reduced medical isotope production.

DOE must discuss how the needs for the space mission, national security needs and medical isotope production will be compatible in the various reactors currently in use or proposed for use. As some isotopes, such as molybdenum-99, are produced by fission, and other isotopes are produced by neutron absorption, the PEIS must specify how each isotope is produced and whether such production is feasible in the reactors planned for use. If the reactor(s) must be modified in order to produce certain isotopes a full discussion of such modification must be included in the Consolidation EIS.

Also, if the ATR or other reactors in use or planned for use must be modified to allow for certain research testing, Pu-238 production, isotopic production or addition of a lead-bismuth loop for testing associated with Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW), there must be a full discussion of such modifications and associated health, safety and nonproliferation implications. The licensing of such a modification for ATR must be factored into the analysis.

David B. McCoy
Attorney (California Bar 170737)
2940 Redbarn Lane
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

1. http://www.magicvalley.com/news/localstate/index.asp?StoryID=13211 Dec. 10, 2004 "Public questions INEEL project ... Some say the issue boils down to 'trust' " By Michelle Dunlop
Times-News writer quoting Tim Frazier, DOE Project Manager.

2. EPA IG Evaluation Report No. 2004-P-00006, February 5, 2004 http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20040205-2004-00006.pdf

3. http://www.nuclearactive.org/news/111903.html

4. http://216.239.63.104/search?q=cache:1Cwm0qn-RbgJ:www.ig.doe.gov/text/ig-0601.rtf+INEEL+Environmental+Mission+funds+audit+report&hl=en

5. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:9w8rE0hn5FoJ:www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/IG-APP-005.pdf++DOE+Inspector+General+(A031D030).&hl=en at p. 32

6. http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0649.pdf See also, http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0571.pdf

7. http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/wrb0104.pdf

8. http://www.bredl.org/nuclear/SRS_CAB1115-162004.htm

9. http://www.spacepolicy.org/page_dg0899.html

10. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/09/040921080036.htm

11. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB143/ The Spy Satellite So Stealthy that the Senate Couldn't Kill It, The National Security Archive, December 14,2004.

12. NI PEIS Appendix Q - Nuclear Infrastructure Non-proliferation Impact Assessment,For Accomplishing Expanded Civilian Nuclear Energy Research and Development and Isotope Production Missions in the US, Including the Role of the Fast Flux Test Facility, Sept 2000, USDOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation. ("Nuclear Infrastructure Nonproliferation Impact Assessment, DOE September 2000, p. ES-3.")

13. Nuclear Infrastructure Nonproliferation Impact Assessment, DOE September 2000, p. ES-5.

14. Nuclear Infrastructure Nonproliferation Impact Assessment, DOE September 2000, p. ES-9.

15. ... "some nuclear weapons contain plutonium-238 to power a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). The amount of plutonium-238 depends on the power requirements for nuclear weapons; 1 gram of plutonium-238 generates about 0.57 watts of heat, which could be converted to no more than 0.06 watts of electric power." http://216.239.63.104/search?q=cache:uBQnDjt2l8cJ:www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/fetter/1990-SAGS-Pu.pdf+plutonium-238+fire+ORNL&hl=en (See fn. 7)

16. http://engineering.union.edu/me_dept/faculty/treaty1.html

17. See footnote 16.

18. http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/guide/explanatory.aspx?n=297&c=2 Washington passed this initiative against more importation of radioactive waste.

19. http://www.bredl.org/pdf/SRSfactsheet12oct02.PDF

20. http://www.ananuclear.org/ajcpuoped.html Follow SC Governor's Lead and Oppose Plutonium Plan, Atlanta Journal-ConstitutionAugust 28, 2001 "Hiding behind the jobs and national security banners, DOE has dumped, processed, shipped, stored, and mismanaged nuclear material in our region, facing little resistance as it did so. Governor Hodges is finally changing that. We in Georgia cannot help but applaud his efforts and stand with him."

21. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/savannah_river.htm

22. SRS- Pu238 processing
Old HB Line
The Old HB Line is a Pu-238 processing facility that was shut down in 1984. It produced Pu-238 oxide primarily for the space program as a heat source to be used in generating electricity for spacecraft going into deep space. It was upgraded throughout its existence, but in 1984 was replaced by the new HB Line.

D&D of the Old HB Line facility began in 1984. The D&D efforts were interrupted in 1986 because of a lack of funds. At that time, the scrap recovery process and the shielding for the neptunium oxide process had been removed. When the effort was resumed in 1988, the contamination in these two areas ranged from 40 to 100 million d/m/.1 square meter alpha. On July 26, 1990, D&D work in Room 306 of the Old HB Line was curtailed when concerns involving radiological control practices were raised. The concerns resulted when four radiation workers in plastic suits with breathing air became contaminated, during an emergency exiting of a highly contaminated area of Old HB Line, due to the failure of the 221H breathing air compressor. Further reviews of this incident resulted in stopping work in Room 306.

HB Line
HB Line is a 28,000 square foot plutonium processing facility constructed in three phases during the 1980s. The HB Line plutonium processing facilities are located on top of the H-Area Canyon Building 221-H and include the Scrap Recovery Facility (Phase I) and the Plutonium Oxide Facility (Phase III). The Frame Waste Recovery process is located within the 221-H building. The HB Line facility also houses a vault for the storage of Pu-238 oxide product and scrap material.

Phase I provides a scrap recovery facility, where materials are dissolved in nitric acid and transferred to H Canyon. There are two glove box lines (North and South), of which only the North is operating.

Phase II provides the neptunium oxide facility, where Pu-239 and Np-237 nitrate solutions are received from H-Canyon and converted to oxide. Phase II is not operating.

Phase III provides the plutonium oxide facility, where Pu-242 is received from H Canyon and converted to oxide. Phase III is operating. The Old HB Line is an abandoned plutonium processing facility currently undergoing D&D. Old HB Line is contained within H Canyon and was operated between 1963 and 1984.

The HB Line was built on top of the canyon in the early 1980s, replacing an existing facility (Old HB Line) located on the third and fourth levels of the H Canyon. The HB Line facility operated between 1985 and 1987. These operations were assessed in a 1991 environmental assessment, resulting in a finding of "No Significant Impact" issued in July 1991. The HB Line resumed operations, and, seven days after restart, operations in the HB Line were suspended due to radiological contamination of five workers resulting from conduct of operations inadequacies involving Pu-238 scrap stored in the HB Line vault. Operations resumed in October 1991. One month later, operations were again suspended due to an inadvertent transfer of zirconium within the HB Line. Operations then resumed in December 1991. In March 1992, operations in HB Line and H Canyon were suspended because of a safety question concerning the air exhaust stack liner. Operations resumed in January 1993 and have continued to the present.

23. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:P2sd-anbK9sJ:www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/srs/wr_20040102_sr.pdf+a+pyrophoric+reaction+was+observed+by+operators+in+HB-Line&hl=en

24. http://sro.srs.gov/srs_pmp/8.11bnm4-22-04.pdf

25. "The Secretary will have to fight a lot of political battles to get this facility [FFTF] reopened." Minutes for the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee Meeting July 29-30, 1999, p.7.

26. http://www.ne.doe.gov/nerac/july99-minutes.pdf p.6

27. http://www.hanfordwatch.org/archive/newsletter--4-11-99.htm

28. http://www.flybynews.com/archives/ref/ianusreg.htm - at 2.3

29. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/enviro/ea_0948.htm#1405

30. The Times Record, 1/16/2004 Bush's space plan opposed. http://www.cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/bush_plan_opposed.htm

31. http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0104-35.htm Rude Awakening to Missile-Defense Dream by Scott Ritter

32. http://www.oversight.state.id.us/ov_library/OverviewReport2000/AMWTP.pdf

33. http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:f9tI96OZu9kJ:www.iowa-psr.org/makhijani%2520bad%2520old%2520days.pdf+LANL+offsite+plutonium+contamination&hl=en
See also, http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_3/3-1/humanex.html

34. http://www.nuclearactive.org/docs/RighttoKnow.html

35. http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/1207.html

See also, http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:StVgiO733Y0J:www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0591.pdf+&hl=en

36. http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve1/985space.html

37. http://www.ne.doe.gov/nerac/NERAC%20Idaho%20Infrastructure%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf See, p.17

38. http://www.iowa-psr.org/makhijani%20bad%20old%20days.pdf

39. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:gODtK8n03tsJ:www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/lanl/wr_20041112_la.pdf+TA-55+operations+cease&hl=en http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/lanl/wr_20041112_la.pdf

"Plutonium Facility (TA-55): The LANL Director has approved resumption of TA-55 Pu-238 operations. The LRR review of these operations identified several areas needing improvement, including: more timely repair of degraded equipment and revision of incorrect procedures; more rigorous management of on-the-job training; and more deliberate confirmation of readiness. On the positive side, the LRR team found that management effectively communicates information to workers and workers understand the importance of procedural compliance.

Deliberate resumption of Pu-238 operations is a key step for LANL to clean-up Room 201B, which was contaminated with Pu-238 in August 2003. LANL also intends to quickly finish 23 encapsulated fueled- clads to support the NASA New Horizons mission to Pluto. DOE has stated that the 23 fueled-clads are sufficient and that the new scrap recovery line is not needed to support the New Horizons mission (ref: Board letter 8/1/03). Given the progress of the MSA/LRR resumption process, an essential activity re-designation for the fueled-clad activity is no longer being pursued."

40. http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2003/08/11/text01.shtml Two TA-55 workers contaminated - Two Laboratory employees were contaminated during routine inventory work last Tuesday at the Plutonium Processing Facility at Technical Area 55.

41. http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/oak_ridge/wr_20040507_or.pdf

42. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:LjrJlNN7k00J:www.doeal.gov/laaoabt/Internet/Resumes/RESUME_lee_4-16-03s.pdf+plutonium+fire+TA-55&hl=en http://www.doeal.gov/laaoabt/Internet/Resumes/RESUME_lee_4-16-03s.pdf

43. http://www.radiation-scott.org/05-95fire.htm

44. http://www.radiation-scott.org/19-95gloveboxfireanalysis.htm

45. http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=18281

46. http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.energy.24.1.281;jsessionid=iNtkZ6IjW-I9?cookieSet=1

47. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:wImGcnY9L-kJ:arctic.ithium.net/IPB2.0/index.php%3Fshowtopic%3D157%26view%3Dgetlastpost+space+battery+alternative+Pu-238&hl=en

48. http://www.ieer.org/reports/srs/hlwanalysis.html The Savannah River at Grievous Risk

49. http://www.deprep.org/2002/FB02A23A.HTM

50. http://www.wise-paris.org/index.html?/english/ournewsletter/17_18/page4.html&/english/frame/menu.html&/english/frame/band.html

51. See, Security Drill at Weapons Plant Raises Safety Questions http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/21/national/21nuke.html?pagewanted=print&position=

See also, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/12/03/mit_forced_to_halt_probe_of_alleged_fraud_at_lincoln_la

52. http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/IG-APP-005.pdf See, p. 28

53. http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/consumerawareness/a/missingpluto.htm

54. http://usgovinfo.about.com/b/a/099478.htm

55. http://www.wise-paris.org/index.html?/english/ournewsletter/17_18/page7.html&/english/frame/menu.html&/english/frame/band.html